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Anything you can do, I can do better 
I can do anything better than you 
No, you can’t 
Yes, I can 
No, you can’t. . . 
Yes, I can!  Yes, I can!1 
INTRODUCTION 
Competition is deeply woven into the fabric of our American heritage.  
No small amount of competitive spirit helped drive the Founders’ efforts 
to design and to establish “a more perfect Union”2—a unique political 
structure intended to improve upon what the world had observed to date.  
That competitive spirit drove us to push and to expand boundaries of all 
sorts over the last (nearly) 250 years.  It manifests in scientific, 
mathematic, medical, and technological developments and other academic 
endeavors; in ubiquitous athletic programs; and even in our art and 
entertainment, including in the lyrics to Broadway musicals. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that competition has also been a 
foundational principle guiding the American economy since its inception.3  
Competition has been the primary code by which firms live and die, 
succeed and fail, win and lose.  This code has led directly to tremendous 
achievements that revolutionized not only our country, but the world—
such as the Ford assembly line, which transformed an industry; the advent 
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 1. IRVING BERLIN, Anything You Can Do (I Can Do Better), in ANNIE GET YOUR GUN (Richard 
Rodgers & Oscar Hammerstein II, 1946). 
 2. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 3. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic 
policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”). 
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of the personal computer which transformed much more than just an 
industry; and the introduction of cell phones and smart phones, which have 
dramatically expanded our access to information and our ability to interact 
with the world around us. 
Keeping our markets competitive has, accordingly, also been a 
longstanding high priority.4  The focus of concern has shifted and adapted 
over the years as the economy itself has developed and expanded.  Today, 
the question of how competition is—or is not—functioning in the big tech 
space has become a particularly compelling topic.  The last several years 
have seen an increasing popular interest in antitrust, and it appears that 
wave of interest may soon be cresting.  As the next presidential election 
nears, the candidates’ focus upon antitrust and big tech issues seems 
unlikely to dissipate.  Indeed, the seemingly unprecedented prominence of 
antitrust among presidential candidates has led commentators to speculate 
that, “Antitrust has become such a big deal that it seems certain to be a 
dominant theme in the presidential election—the last time that happened 
was 1912—making 2020 the year of the great antitrust reawakening.”5 
Rhetoric has grown increasingly aggressive, and the list of alleged ills 
is long.  Companies are simply too big, too influential, too powerful; they 
are destroying our democracy and undermining our social values.6  While 
allegations run the gambit, under particular attack are tech firms that 
operate in multiple, complementary markets.  Amazon is allegedly 
abusing its market position by selling its own products on its platform in 
competition with other retailers.7  Google is allegedly unlawfully 
 
 4. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard 
Oil, 340 U.S. at 248). 
 5. Joe Nocera, The Great Antitrust Awakening Can’t Be Stopped, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Oct. 24, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-10-24/2020-will-be-anti 
trust-s-great-awakening [https://perma.cc/C3GL-P748]. 
 6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c 
[https://perma.cc/Q4KC-V9S7] (“Today’s big tech companies have too much power—too much 
power over our economy, our society, and our democracy.”); Russell Brandom, The Monopoly-
Busting Case Against Google, Amazon, Uber, and Facebook, THE VERGE (Sept. 5, 2018, 8:14 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/5/17805162/monopoly-antitrust-regulation-google-amazon-uber 
-facebook [https://perma.cc/T935-8SQY] (describing several antitrust theories and complaints against 
big tech companies); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 235–36 (2017) (arguing that 
modern antitrust enforcement has allowed too much consolidation, which in turn contributes to market 
power which exacerbates economic inequality); Matt Stoller, The Return of Monopoly, NEW REPUBLIC 
(July 13, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143595/return-monopoly-amazon-rise-business 
-tycoon-white-house-democrats-return-party-trust-busting-roots [https://perma.cc/U284-NG6M] 
(arguing firms today often have too much economic power, and that “[i]ncreasing concentration of 
ownership has [] led to unprecedented levels of corporate crime”). 
 7. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); Alex 
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monopolizing its position in the search engine market by preferencing its 
own products and content associated with its platform.8 Facebook is 
wielding its substantial market position to increasingly keep users on its 
platforms (and away from competitors’ platforms).9  Apple is allegedly 
abusing its market position by establishing coercive terms of service on its 
App Store.10  The theme common to each of these allegations (and more) 
is that antitrust scrutiny is increasingly targeting tech firms’ entry into, 
conduct within, and business decisions regarding markets complementary 
to those in which the relevant firm found its original success. 
To combat these purportedly pervasive monopolies, a slew of 
increasingly radical proposals have been made.  These companies need to 
be broken up; they should be regulated like utilities; vertical integration 
must be banned.11  Senator and Democratic presidential primary candidate 
Elizabeth Warren, for instance, has heavily criticized tech companies for 
entering into complementary and adjacent spaces, arguing: “You can run 
the platform—that is, you can be the umpire—or you can have a team in 
the game . . . .  But you don’t get to do both at the same time because that’s 
not a level playing field for anyone else.”12  In response, she calls for 
regulating platforms like utilities and breaking them apart from 
 
Shephard, How Amazon Is Changing the Whole Concept of Monopoly, NEW REPUBLIC (June 19, 
2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143376/amazon-changing-whole-concept-monopoly 
[https://perma.cc/V544-J78W].  
 8. See, e.g., James Titcomb, Google Still Abusing Search Engine Monopoly, Rivals Tell EU, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 28, 2018, 2:06 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018 
/02/28/google-still-abusing-search-engine-monopoly-rivals-tell-eu/ [https://perma.cc/G8YY-6F5W]; 
Google’s Anticompetitive Practices Hurt Consumers, FAIRSEARCH (July 12, 2011), http://fairsearch 
.org/googles-anticompetitive-practices-hurt-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/8MJZ-R7Z6]; Benjamin 
Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Jan. 
19, 2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/ [https://perma.cc/N2SY-7AZZ]. 
 9. See, e.g., Laleh Ispahani, Facebook’s Monopoly Power Threatens Democracy Itself, OPEN 
SOC’Y FOUNDS. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/facebooks 
-monopoly-power-threatens-democracy-itself [https://perma.cc/9LC3-2JV8]; Josh Hawley, Opinion, 
We Might Be Better Off if Facebook, Instagram and Twitter Vanished: Sen. Josh Hawley, USA TODAY 
(May 22, 2019, 3:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/22/facebook-instagram-
twitter-do-more-harm-than-good-column/3751735002/ [https://perma.cc/5ZZB-VJXL]; Antonio 
Garcia Martinez, Facebook Is Not a Monopoly, But It Should Be Broken Up, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-not-monopoly-but-should-broken-up/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7RGX-ZH84]. 
 10. See, e.g., Charlie Wood, Apple CEO Tim Cook Says Monopolies Aren’t Bad If They Aren’t 
Abused, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2019, 5:37 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tim-cook-apple 
-monopolies-not-bad-if-not-abused-2019-12 [https://perma.cc/EHP7-CU6S]; Lauren Feiner, App 
Makers Sue Apple and Claim It Uses ‘Monopoly Power’ to Charge Fees, CNBC (June 5, 2019, 11:17 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/app-makers-sue-apple-and-claim-it-uses-monopoly-power 
-to-charge-fees.html [https://perma.cc/35NV-MFBE]. 
 11. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6; Stoller, supra note 6.  See generally Khan, supra note 7. 
 12. Jessica Taylor, Sen. Elizabeth Warren Blasts Big Tech, Advocates Taxing Rich in 2020 Race, 
NPR (Mar. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/15/702707734/sen-elizabeth-warren 
-takes-longtime-fight-for-a-level-playing-field-to-2020-race [https://perma.cc/AK2F-47RK]. 
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participants on the platform.13  These arguments echo the sentiment that 
competing in multiple spaces is, somehow, inherently harmful to 
competition. 
This rhetoric is eerily similar to that of a bygone era of antitrust 
enforcement—namely, the time when the inhospitality tradition prevailed.  
By the middle of the 20th century, antitrust courts routinely—often 
summarily—condemned any contract or behavior they deemed to be 
nonstandard or unusual.  This approach reflected an extreme hostility to 
firm behavior—a hostility that seems to be making a resurgence today—
and led to the coining of the phrase “inhospitality tradition” to describe the 
prevailing antitrust regime. 
The inhospitality tradition often led to incoherent, nonsensical 
outcomes.  Courts condemned conduct that made firms better competitors 
in the name of preserving competition.14  And they ignored the actual or 
likely competitive effects of conduct before them because they found the 
form of that conduct offensive.15 The courts eventually abandoned this 
approach.  As economic learning advanced and court experience grew, the 
negatives of condemning as per se unlawful large swaths of firm conduct 
on the basis of its form—rather than its effects—crystalized and could no 
longer be ignored.  From this new economic learning, economists and 
scholars came to realize that many procompetitive reasons can, and often 
do, underlie much of the conduct that had been summarily condemned.  
And they learned that judging the conduct on its face, much like judging a 
book by its cover, tended to yield inferior outcomes.  Not only in the 
immediate sense, wherein consumers suffered in the cases before them—
sometimes in the form of admittedly higher prices on items like shoes and 
groceries16—but also longer term.  If firms were routinely condemned for 
pioneering new ways to satisfy consumer demands, they would become 
more reluctant to even try, and competition within and across industries 
would be dampened.  Accordingly, the courts since this time have 
 
 13. Warren, supra note 6. 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 296–97 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“In a sense, the defendants are being punished for the sin of aggressive competition.”); 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 600 (1972) (condemning conduct while 
acknowledging it “improved the competitive potential of” the defendants); Aaron Director & Edward 
H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 17 MISS. C.L. REV. 7, 11 (“Perhaps, then the 
successful competitor can be turned upon when he wins, because he has been told not to compete.”). 
 15. See infra Section I.A. 
 16. See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (accepting that “occasional higher 
costs and prices might result from” its interpretation and holding); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 
386 U.S. 685, 699–700 (1967) (condemning conduct that resulted in lower prices because it impaired 
a competitor’s ability to compete); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323–
24 (1897) (“[m]ere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in” was not a compelling reason to 
permit conduct). 
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repeatedly and consistently emphasized the importance of relying upon 
new economic learning and upon the evidence of likely effects in crafting 
antitrust policy and decisions. 
Yet today, big tech critics frequently call for a policy of condemnation 
detached from effects, and for a regression back to the pre-new economic 
learning era.  The potential harms from adopting such an approach likely 
cannot be overstated.  The prospect of unfettered growth drives firms to 
compete harder—to find innovative ways to lower prices, to create new 
products, or to offer new services.17  As history has illustrated, impairing 
that prospect can have commensurate negative impacts upon how 
aggressively firms compete.  Limiting growth and expansion explicitly 
would have a particular propensity to destroy incentives to compete.  In a 
space like big tech—where innovation and competition has been so critical 
to driving tremendous consumer benefits, and which has become such an 
integral component of the modern economy—destroying any competitive 
impulse risks eliminating immense value. 
Part I of this Article delves into the history of the inhospitality tradition 
within antitrust law, tracing its rise and demise.  Part II explicates the 
apparent resurgence of hostile sentiment, particularly as applied to the tech 
context.  Part III then investigates whether there is evidence of a market 
failure in big tech.  Part IV analyzes what may—or may not—be warranted 
given the current state of the empirical literature. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF ANTITRUST’S INHOSPITALITY TRADITION 
Early antitrust law was characterized by numerous shortcomings—it 
was criticized as being internally inconsistent, incoherent, and largely 
unpredictable18 (with the caveat that government plaintiffs would always 
 
 17. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, 
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”). 
 18. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 43, 44 (2000) (“Most economists in the late 19th century scorned the 
Sherman Act.  At best, the statute seemed a harmless measure incapable of halting an irresistible trend 
toward firms of larger scale and scope.  At worst, the law would impede attainment of superior 
efficiency promised by new forms of industrial organization.” (internal citations omitted)); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 85 (2018) (noting court decisions during 
this time “completely destroyed the very small, locally owned businesses that the decisions were 
intended to protect”); Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and 
Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 352 (2019) (examining the history and 
explaining that “it is widely acknowledged by commentators across the political spectrum that prior 
to the antitrust revolution, antitrust jurisprudence was an incoherent and unpredictable body of law 
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prevail19).  Many of these shortcomings derived from the attempt to 
maximize numerous, often conflicting, values via the antitrust laws.20  
Embedded within this conflicting value system was an instinctive 
skepticism of firms that were considered too big or conduct that was 
considered too new.21  This skepticism manifested in an hostility that 
would come to define an era of antitrust enforcement. 
But this era would come and pass—and for good reason.  In response 
to intense criticism, both economists and jurists updated their priors.  
Economists devoted tremendous efforts to better understanding the 
reasons underlying various firm decisions, focusing more rigorously upon 
the effects of these decisions, and how best to craft antitrust policy in light 
of those effects.22  These efforts led to important insights, and ultimately 
 
that frequently showed hostility to business”); Elyse Dorsey & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusionary 
Conduct in Antitrust, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 101, 108 (2015) (noting that scholars analyzing antitrust 
jurisprudence up to the mid-twentieth century “in many cases[] found antitrust to be a meandering and 
incoherent jumble”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of 
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 
217 (2010) (“Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court simply did not know what it was doing in 
antitrust cases.”); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to 
Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 177 (2007) (describing the “‘social and political values’ 
paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s, which proved standardless and unduly hostile to business”); ROBERT 
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978) (arguing the numerous 
goals articulated in antitrust cases were “mutually incompatible”); Trouble Begins in the “New” 
Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the A&P Case, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 971 (1949) (“[I]n United 
States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
upheld a criminal conviction in a situation where the defendant corporation represented the forces of 
competition, efficiency and change.  The potential contradiction in the New Sherman Act is sharply 
exposed.”). 
 19. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The sole consistency that I can 
find is that in litigation under § 7 [of the Clayton Act], the Government always wins.”); Kovacic & 
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 51 (“Most commentators today share Stewart’s gloomy assessment of 
merger jurisprudence in the 1960s and view the Supreme Court’s antipathy toward mergers and doubts 
about market forces as indefensible.”). 
 20. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2405 (2013) (“The Court interpreted the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts to reflect a hodgepodge of social and political goals, many with an explicitly anticompetitive 
bent, such as protecting small traders from more efficient rivals.  The failure of antitrust law to promote 
competition and further consumer welfare over this period is unsurprising and inevitable . . . .”); 
Ginsburg, supra note 18, at 217–18 (“The Court had read into the Sherman Act an assortment of vague 
and, ironically, anti-competitive social and political goals . . . .”). 
 21. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323–26 (1897) (noting that 
the goals of the antitrust laws include protecting “small dealers and worthy men”); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining antitrust laws are “based 
upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable” and were intended to 
“put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them”); 
Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 284 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (goals of the antitrust laws were, inter 
alia, “to protect small businessmen and to stem the rising tide of concentration in the economy”). 
 22. See generally Director & Levi, supra note 14; Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In 
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward 
a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965); Robert H. Bork & Ward S. 
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helped to inform the courts and to evolve antitrust law beyond a 
jurisprudential approach based more upon instinctive beliefs than upon 
real-world evidence. 
A. Early Inhospitality in Antitrust 
Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Donald Turner is largely credited 
with coining the term “inhospitality tradition,” which is commonly used 
to refer to the antitrust regime that had developed by the middle of the last 
century.  In remarks reflecting on the state of antitrust law in the mid-
1960s, AAG Turner noted that he would approach certain “restrictions not 
hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition 
of antitrust law.”23  And with that, a new phrase capturing an existing 
phenomenon entered the antitrust lexicon. 
But what, precisely, was the inhospitality tradition to which AAG 
Turner referred?  Many have offered descriptions of a system wherein 
courts routinely condemned behavior based upon either the size of the 
firm—if a large competitor did something, it was likely unlawful—or the 
court’s unfamiliarity with the conduct—if the conduct was not, in the 
court’s view, a traditional way of conducting business (if it was unusual 
or nonstandard) it was likely unlawful.  Judge Easterbrook, for instance, 
explained “[t]he tradition is that judges view each business practice with 
suspicion, always wondering how firms are using it to harm consumers.  If 
the defendant cannot convince the judge that its practices are an essential 
feature of competition, the judge forbids their use.”24 
This skepticism was reflected in the ready condemnation—often upon 
a finding of per se illegality—in many cases and to many categories of 
conduct.  Mergers were routinely condemned.25  Nearly all vertical 
arrangements were treated as per se unlawful.26  The Supreme Court in Dr. 
 
Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in 
Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Ward S. Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: 
II, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965). 
 23. Mark J. Niefer, Donald Turner, Vertical Restraints, and the Inhospitality Tradition of 
Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 389, 389–390 (2019) (quoting AAG Turner in his 1966 speech before 
the New York State Bar Association).  Though as Niefer has explained, this cute turn-of-phrase in fact 
fails to capture the nuance and thoughtfulness AAG Turner actually devoted to analyzing such 
restraints.  See id. at 390.  
 24. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). 
 25. See, e.g., Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 278–79 (1966); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 
374 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962). 
 26. Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, supra note 18, at 84 (“Antitrust policy from the New Deal 
through the early 1970s became an economically irrational war on vertical integration of all types.”); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 863, 879 (2010) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration] (“The history of legal 
policy toward vertical integration in the United States reflects an extraordinary amount of antipathy.”). 
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Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,27 for example, considered 
the lawfulness under the antitrust laws of minimum resale price 
requirements.  The Court quickly found that such restrictions have “for 
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices,” 
were “injurious to the public interest and void,” and were “not saved by 
the advantages which the participants expect to derive from the enhanced 
price to the consumer.”28  Later, when examining the legality of maximum 
resale price maintenance, the Court found that such agreements were 
likewise per se unlawful as they, “no less than those [agreements] to fix 
minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their 
ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.”29  Similarly, in 
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, the Court found that 
“[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of 
competition.”30  Attempts by a manufacturer to impose territorial 
restrictions upon its retailers were also unlawful per se, being considered 
“so obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is 
enough.”31 
As Alan Meese has recognized, the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.32 is particularly striking example 
of the inhospitality tradition in action.33  It is striking both because of its 
whole-hearted adoption of the hostile language and treatment that had 
characterized the antitrust regime leading up to this decision, and because 
inklings that the Court would soon move away from the inhospitality 
tradition had already begun to percolate—indeed, the potential 
procompetitive concerns the Court so summarily rejected in Topco would 
soon be considered critical to a fulsome antitrust analysis.34 
In Topco, several small and medium regional supermarket operators 
formed a cooperative buying organization to procure and distribute private 
label products in exclusive areas.35  The Government alleged this exclusive 
 
 27. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 
U.S. 877 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 408; see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
 29. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951), overruled 
by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 30. 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). 
 31. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967). 
 32. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 33. Alan J. Meese, Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice 
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1780–82 (2006). 
 34. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (noting this case was 
the “first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement,” and finding the Court knew 
“too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a 
conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before” it).   
 35. 405 U.S. at 598. 
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division of territories constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.36  
While the district court disagreed and found in favor of the defendant, the 
Supreme Court later reversed.37  The district court’s analysis of the 
conduct at issue remarkably resembles modern-day court analyses.  It 
found that the introduction of private labels was “[p]erhaps the most 
competitively significant innovation of the national mass 
merchandisers.”38  These private labels provided numerous benefits to 
supermarkets, including that they offered “higher profits on products 
equivalent in quality to national brands which, in turn, permit lower 
consumer prices on products of high quality”; allowed the supermarkets 
to exercise exclusive control over important aspects of the production 
process, including supply sources, quality standards, packaging design and 
procurement, and pricing and promotion; permitted the chains to bargain 
more favorably with national brand manufacturers and to purchase 
products on more advantageous terms; and provided greater 
merchandising flexibility.39  The district court further identified benefits 
that flowed directly to consumers, including lower consumer prices—on 
average, private label products were about twenty percent lower than 
advertised brand prices—and the “stimulation of additional innovation, 
lower prices, better quality and service from the national brand 
manufacturers.”40 
Furthermore, the district court explicitly found the “only way that 
chains the size of Topco members can obtain volumes necessary to achieve 
effective and economically feasible private label competition with the 
larger chains is to become affiliated with a buying organization.”41  An 
independent private label “would require an annual sales volume of $250 
million or more and in order to achieve optimum efficiency, the volume 
required would probably have to be twice that amount.”42  Yet Topco 
members’ annual sales volumes ranged from just $1.6 million to nearly 
$183 million, with eighteen of the twenty-six members “well under $100 
million.”43  Indeed, the court found that generally “Topco members have 
been independently unable to develop efficient or effective private label 
programs.”44  Moreover, as Topco members obtained the scale necessary 
 
 36. Id. at 597. 
 37. Id. 
 38. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev’d, 405 
U.S. 596 (1972). 
 39. Id. at 1035–36. 
 40. Id. at 1035. 
 41. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1033. 
 44. Id. at 1038. 
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to “undertake a successful private label program on their own,” many 
exited the buying cooperative.45  The court also found compelling 
evidence that the exclusive territorial restrictions were necessary for the 
Topco organization to exist at all.46  Ultimately, then, the lower court 
concluded that “[w]hatever anti-competitive effect these [exclusive] 
practices may have on competition in the sale of Topco private label 
brands is far outweighed by the increased ability of Topco members to 
compete both with national chains and other supermarkets operating in 
their respective territories.”47 
Despite the thoughtful analysis the district court offered, the Supreme 
Court quickly found the conduct at issue constituted a violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act—and a per se one, at that.48  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged the Topco members lacked any meaningful market power: 
Topco members’ market shares ranged from one-and-a-half percent to 
sixteen percent, and averaged only about six percent.49  The Court further 
recognized that “only 10% of the total goods sold by Topco members 
b[ore] the association’s brand names,” and that the private label brands’ 
“very existence [] improved the competitive potential of Topco 
members.”50 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded the agreement was a horizontal 
territorial restraint and, accordingly, per se unlawful.51  It invalidated the 
efficiencies the lower court had so painstakingly scrutinized.52  And it 
explicitly rejected the idea that intrabrand restrictions could help facilitate 
interbrand competition.53  Thus, in the name of competition, the Court 
summarily condemned conduct that “improved the competitive potential” 
of the defendants before it.54 
 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 1042–43. 
 47. Id. at 1043. 
 48. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 600.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 608. 
 52. Id. at 610–11. 
 53. Id. (“The District Court determined that by limiting the freedom of its individual members to 
compete with each other, Topco was doing a greater good by fostering competition between members 
and other large supermarket chains.  But, the fallacy in this is that Topco has no authority under the 
Sherman Act to determine the respective values of competition in various sectors of the economy.”); 
see also id. at 612 (“We also strike down Topco’s other restrictions on the right of its members to 
wholesale goods . . . .  Like territorial restrictions, limitations on customers are intended to limit intra-
brand competition and to promote inter-brand competition.  For the reasons previously discussed, the 
arena in which Topco members compete must be left to their unfettered choice absent a contrary 
congressional determination.”). 
 54. Id. at 600. 
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While the lower court’s analysis reads much like a modern-day 
antitrust decision—focusing upon the effects of the conduct before it—the 
Supreme Court’s decision remained firmly rooted in the inhospitality 
tradition.  But changes were already afoot, and the tide would soon shift.55  
In that sense, Topco ends up representing the highwater mark of the 
inhospitality era. 
B. Establishing an Effects-Based Approach 
Beginning shortly before the Supreme Court’s decision in Topco, and 
growing in force afterwards, was a movement away from the inhospitality 
tradition.  Courts began to consider more rigorously the conduct before 
them.  Whereas earlier courts often felt comfortable summarily 
condemning conduct, courts in the latter half of the twentieth century 
found a more critical review of the conduct—and of its effects—was in 
order. 
This changing trend was the result of a combination of factors.  As 
noted, antitrust jurisprudence leading up to this point was the subject of a 
tremendous amount of criticism for its numerous fundamental failures.56  
At the same time, economic theory itself was developing in important 
ways that would ultimately affect the shape of the law.  As scholars have 
noted, it was not merely populist notions underpinning the inhospitality 
tradition, but also prevailing economic theories, which likewise tended to 
reject any potential efficiency or procompetitive reasons for many 
restraints.57  This trend among economists led Nobel Laureate Ronald H. 
Coase to remark that “if an economist finds something . . . that he does not 
understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.  And as in this field we 
are very ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be 
rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.”58 
As economists responded to such criticisms, economic theory 
developed and gained a more comprehensive understanding of how and 
why firms might enter into differing arrangements, and the essentially 
 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 613 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have here an agreement among several 
small grocery chains to join in a cooperative endeavor that, in my view, has an unquestionably lawful 
principal purpose; in pursuit of that purpose they have mutually agreed to certain minimal ancillary 
restraints that are fully reasonable in view of the principal purpose and that have never before today 
been held by this Court to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.”); see also White Motor Co. v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963). 
 56. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 57. Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law 
Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO L.J. 835, 851–52 (2016). 
 58. Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) 
[hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization]. 
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irrebuttable skepticism of many types of restraints began to dissipate.  The 
notion that many of these restraints could yield real consumer benefits—
and, accordingly, the notion that the likely effects of the restraints, rather 
than their form alone, should govern the analysis—began to take hold in 
the economic literature.59  The courts, in turn, followed suit.60 
One of the earliest cases reflecting this more rigorous framework was 
Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,61 in which the Court 
reconsidered the per se treatment for vertical territorial restrictions a 
manufacturer imposed upon its retailers.  Quite unlike in its Topco 
decision, the Court here recognized the “market impact of vertical 
restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous 
reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand 
competition.”62  The Court explicitly recognized “a number of ways in 
which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively 
against other manufacturers,”63 including by aligning incentives between 
themselves and their retailers, eliminating free-riding, and encouraging 
retailer investment of capital and labor.64  Whereas Topco rejected the 
notion that a reduction in intrabrand competition could be a cognizable 
benefit, the GTE Sylvania Court accepted that the modern economic 
understanding of competitive effects had developed to encompass a 
broader notion of how competition might operate in the real world—and 
updated its jurisprudence accordingly. 
Another notable case arising just a couple years later was Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI).65  This case, 
along with GTE Sylvania, is generally considered a turning point in 
antitrust law and the beginning of a real conception of efficiencies in 
antitrust precedent.66  In BMI the Court was tasked with deciding whether 
 
 59. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30 ECON. 
INQUIRY 294, 301–03 (1992); see also Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 52–59; Wright et al., 
supra note 18, at 302–08; Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 18, at 108–14. 
 60. See, e.g., Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 52–59; Wright et al., supra note 18, at 302–
08; Dorsey & Jacobson, supra note 18, at 114–17. 
 61. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 62. Id. at 51. 
 63. Id. at 54–55. 
 64. Id. at 55.  
 65. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 66. See, e.g., Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 18, at 53 (describing GTE Sylvania as “[t]he pivotal 
event”); James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy As a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 639, 640 (2005) (describing GTE Sylvania as a “watershed” case in which “the Supreme Court 
eschewed its prior ‘formalistic line drawing,’ and instead based its decision on demonstrable economic 
effects”); William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 214–15 (2003) 
(noting BMI and GTE Sylvania were two of the first cases in which the Supreme Court expanded its 
consideration of efficiencies in antitrust law generally).  
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“blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions” at fees the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and 
BMI negotiated constituted per se unlawful price fixing.67  Examining the 
facts before it, the Court explained that “ASCAP and the blanket license 
developed together out of the practical situation in the marketplace: 
thousands of users, thousands of copyright owners, and millions of 
compositions.”68  The reality was that most users demanded “unplanned, 
rapid, and indemnified access to any and all of the repertory of 
compositions,” while owners demanded a “reliable method of collecting 
for the use of their copyrights.”69  The Court further found that the costs 
of negotiating individual licenses that could conceivably satisfy all these 
demands was prohibitive.70  To overcome this stalemate, the blanket 
license was born. 
Given this backdrop, the Court held the per se rule was inappropriate.71  
While offering the underlying product (the blanket licenses) literally 
required horizontal competitors to establish (or to fix) a price for that 
product, this literal view was, as it often is, “overly simplistic and [] 
overbroad.”72  The Court found that the blanket licenses created a whole 
that was “truly greater than the sum of its parts; it [wa]s, to some extent, a 
different product.”73  Again, this analysis represents a distinct 
development and a willingness to consider the context and effects of the 
conduct under review that was missing from the Supreme Court’s Topco 
decision.  Topco members in fact created different products (the private 
label brand) that could not have existed otherwise, but the Court 
nonetheless summarily condemned their conduct. 
Since then, the Court has continued its evolution beyond the 
inhospitality tradition, and modern antitrust law emphasizes heavily the 
importance of considering the likely effects of allegedly unlawful conduct.  
Indeed, the courts today embrace new economic learning and have 
repeatedly made clear that per se treatment is reserved for that conduct 
with which the court has sufficient, significant experience to say with 
confidence that it always or almost always will be harmful to 
 
 67. BMI, 441 U.S. at 4–7. 
 68. Id. at 20. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (“[A]s both the Court of Appeals and CBS recognize, the costs are prohibitive for licenses 
with individual radio stations, nightclubs, and restaurants, and it was in that milieu that the blanket 
license arose.”).  
 71. Id. at 18. 
 72. Id. at 8–9. 
 73. Id. at 21–22. 
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competition.74  Likewise, the courts have consistently recognized that the 
“economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for” 
various vertical (and horizontal) arrangements.75 
Despite this widespread agreement, commentators today are 
increasingly agitating for what would amount to a rejection of this new 
learning and a return to the inhospitality tradition.  As developed below, 
these critics call for fundamental changes to the antitrust laws that would 
(among other things) prohibit, or presumptively prohibit, conduct that is 
evaluated under the rule of reason today because of its potential to yield 
significant procompetitive effects. 
Before turning to those calls, it is worth noting one final case that 
seems squarely on point with regard to the current debate.  In United States 
v. Microsoft,76 the D.C. Circuit was tasked with evaluating a situation very 
similar to what antitrust enforcers currently face—namely, new 
combinations of new products.  In Microsoft, the court considered, among 
other issues, whether the contractual and technological bundling of 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser (the tied product) with its 
Windows operating system (the tying product) constituted a per se 
unlawful tying arrangement.77  The court acknowledged—but did not pass 
judgment on—Microsoft’s alleged efficiency arguments for the 
arrangement.78  It then remanded this claim to the district court, noting: 
[T]hese and other novel, purported efficiencies suggest that judicial 
‘experience’ provides little basis for believing that, “because of their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue,” a 
software firm’s decisions to sell multiple functionalities as a package 
should be “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused 
or the business excuse for their use.”79   
The Microsoft court, in other words, declined to return to the inhospitality 
 
 74. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“The object is to see whether 
the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about 
the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a 
more sedulous one.  And of course what we see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case 
after case reach identical conclusions.”); BMI, 441 U.S. at 2, 9–10 (“‘[I]t is only after considerable 
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations’ . . . .  We 
have never examined a practice like this one before.” (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 
405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972))); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same). 
 75. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007); see also 
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727–29 (1988); Cont’l Television, Inc., v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51, 55–56; BMI, 441 U.S. at 22. 
 76. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 77. Id. at 84. 
 78. Id. at 89–90. 
 79. Id. at 90–91 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
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tradition in a case involving new and emerging technologies. 
II. INHOSPITALITY STRIKES BACK? 
Despite that courts and enforcers deliberately abandoned the 
inhospitality tradition—which had unduly condemned conduct that 
benefited consumers—this tradition currently seems to be experiencing 
renewed interest today.  As tech firms continue to grow and to innovate 
new methods by which to permeate daily lives, skeptics express many of 
the same concerns as their counterparts did decades ago.  Indeed, in 
response to an increase in the “number of ununderstandable practices,” we 
seem to be seeing a commensurate rise in the “reliance on monopoly 
explanations.”80 
These include arguments that tech companies are simply too “big,” too 
“powerful,” or too “influential”—or all of these things—and that enforcers 
should do more to constrain these forces.81  Such concerns have been 
expressed on numerous occasions and in various contexts.  But one 
common thread appears to be a particular discomfort with vertical 
integration and related behaviors. 
U.S. politicians, in particular, appear to embrace these lines of 
argument of late.  There has been an uptick in political interest in antitrust 
generally—and, more recently, in how the antitrust laws apply in the tech 
space, specifically.  The 2016 presidential election marked the first time 
in decades that antitrust was explicitly included in a major party 
platform.82  Since then, senators have introduced numerous pieces of 
legislation aimed at increasing antitrust enforcement.83  The Democratic 
Party’s Better Deal, for instance, advocates for stronger structural 
presumptions that would fundamentally shift merger review, as well as for 
a “new consumer competition advocate” to advise the antitrust agencies, 
 
 80. Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 58, at 67. 
 81. See infra Part III.  This Part describes the proposals that have been made, before the article 
turns in Part III to analyzing the bases of these proposals. 
 82. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 11 (2016), 
https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NET 
-RPBS]; Guy Rolnik, 140 Years of Antitrust: “Competition” in Democratic and Republican 
Platforms, PROMARKET (Oct. 11, 2016), https://promarket.org/140-years-antitrust-competition 
-democrat-republican-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/LF2F-BZ3G]. 
 83. See, e.g., Monopolization Deterrence Act of 2019, S. 2237, 116th Cong. (2019) (as referred 
to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 23, 2019); Merger Enforcement Improvement Act, S. 306, 
116th Cong. (2019) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 31, 2019); Consolidation 
Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, S. 307, 116th Cong. (2019) (as referred to the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 31, 2019); Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust 
Review Act of 2018, S. 3404, 115th Cong. (2018) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Aug. 
28, 2018). 
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the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
Commission, in their enforcement efforts.84  In June 2019, the House 
Judiciary Committee announced it had launched a “bipartisan 
investigation into competition in digital markets,” asserting a “small 
number of dominant, unregulated platforms have extraordinary power 
over commerce, communication, and information online.”85  And in July, 
the Department of Justice announced it was “reviewing whether and how 
market-leading online platforms have achieved market power and are 
engaging in practices that have reduced competition, stifled innovation, or 
otherwise harmed consumers.”86 
Much of this interest harkens to the inhospitality tradition, in that its 
supporters often express wide-ranging skepticism of tech companies and 
their behavior.  For instance, several presidential candidates have 
reiterated their support for breaking up—or for seriously considering 
breaking up—large tech firms on antitrust grounds.87  Senator Elizabeth 
Warren released an essay entitled Here’s How We Can Break Up Big 
Tech88 and commissioned a billboard campaign in San Francisco with the 
slogan Break Up Big Tech.89  Her essay argues “big tech companies have 
too much power” and “have hurt small businesses and stifled innovation,” 
and that “[w]eak antitrust enforcement has led to a dramatic reduction in 
competition and innovation in the tech sector.”90  In response, she argues 
an overhaul of our laws is required, proposing, among other things, that 
platforms be regulated as utilities.91  While Warren appears to be the most 
aggressively positioned, she is by no means the only one.  For instance, 
former Vice President Joe Biden has said that breaking up big tech 
 
 84. Crack Down on Corporate Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, A 
BETTER DEAL, https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/the-proposals/crack-down-on-abuse-of 
-power/ [https://perma.cc/6ZPL-Q5VW] (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). 
 85. Press Release, House Comm. on the Judiciary, House Judiciary Committee Launches 
Bipartisan Investigation into Competition in Digital Markets (June 3, 2019), https://judiciary.house 
.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2051 [https://perma.cc/J9TF-74ET]. 
 86. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Reviewing 
the Practices of Market-Leading Online Platforms (July 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/justice-department-reviewing-practices-market-leading-online-platforms [https://perma.cc/3J6A 
-9CZ3]. 
 87. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6 (“[W]e need to stop this generation of big tech companies 
from throwing around their political power to shape the rules in their favor and throwing around their 
economic power to snuff out or buy up every potential competitor.”). 
 88. See id.  
 89. Makena Kelly & Nick Statt, Elizabeth Warren Puts a Giant Tech Breakup Billboard in San 
Francisco’s Face, THE VERGE (May 29, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com 
/2019/5/29/18644590/elizabeth-warren-break-up-big-tech-billboard-amazon-facebook-apple-google 
[https://perma.cc/B6AL-MU7Y]. 
 90. Warren, supra note 6. 
 91. Id. 
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companies is “something we should take a really hard look at”; Senator 
Bernie Sanders has advocated for breaking up such companies; Senator 
Amy Klobuchar has stated she would engage in an “aggressive 
retrospective review of mergers” and investigate big tech; Pete Buttigieg 
has said breakup “should be on the table.”92  Senator Josh Hawley has 
likewise decried Facebook’s power in today’s society and advocated for 
its demise.93 
But this discussion and skepticism is not limited to political 
campaigns.  Academics have made similar arguments.  The level of 
inhospitality proposed varies—ranging from fully embracing such a 
regime to more modest suggestions that would change the margins, rather 
than the heart, of antitrust enforcement.  On the more extreme end, some 
have advocated for banning vertical integration by dominant tech firms or 
platforms and for establishing presumptions of illegality for vertical 
restraints more generally.94  Lina Khan, in particular, argues that vertical 
integration in the tech space is particularly prone to creating “conflicts of 
interest,” and contends that adopting a prophylactic ban on vertical growth 
or expansion “may prove more effective than policing these conflicts.”95  
As developed further below, however, these alleged “conflicts of interest” 
are neither new nor unique to the tech or online platform spaces.96  And 
despite such conflicts, consumers often benefit from vertical growth and 
integration. 
Similar, but slightly less dramatic, proposals call for limiting size or 
limiting vertical integration by acquisition, while preserving the ability of 
firms to expand vertically on their own.97  Harold Feld, for instance, 
expresses significant skepticism of vertical acquisition, but acknowledges 
 
 92. Elizabeth Culliford, Where U.S. Presidential Candidates Stand On Breaking Up Big Tech, 
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2020, 5:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-tech-fact 
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 93. Hawley, supra note 9. 
 94. See Khan, supra note 7, at 803 (“[R]estoring traditional antitrust principles to . . . ban vertical 
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 95. Khan, supra note 7, at 793. 
 96. See infra Section III.B. 
 97. HAROLD FELD, ROOSEVELT INST., THE CASE FOR THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ACT: MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS 94–97 (2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Case-for-the-Digital-Platform-Act-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LA9E 
-RVZH]. 
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the difficulties inherent to trying to stem organic vertical growth.98  He 
argues that “digital platforms are unusual in that a combination of vertical 
features can enhance the overall complementary network effects they 
enjoy, thus increasing dominance by enhancing the cost of exclusion.”99  
And he notes that Amazon’s addition of Prime video does more than better 
position it to compete against YouTube: it also “enhances Amazon’s 
overall value and the overall value of its Prime membership, enhancing its 
dominance in the online shopping market.”100  This line of argument—
much like the inhospitality tradition decisions of yore—acknowledges that 
a firm’s behavior “enhances [its] overall value”101 to consumers—or, in 
the Topco Court’s terms, “improved the competitive potential of” the 
firm102—but nonetheless argues for condemning much of that very same 
conduct (just as the Topco Court did).  In Feld’s view, only a “handful of 
cases” demonstrating the necessity of allowing internal vertical growth 
save it from per se or presumptive condemnation.103 
Other academics have proposed variants that focus upon 
nondiscrimination rather than upon outright bans on, or presumptions of 
illegality for, vertical integration.104  The Stigler Center, for example, 
released a report from a committee of academics on market structure and 
antitrust.105  The report argues that “antitrust law might be revised to relax 
the proof requirements imposed upon antitrust plaintiffs in appropriate 
cases or to reverse burdens of proof.”106  Among the recommendations, the 
report also argues that “[n]on-discrimination can be a helpful tool in 
creating a competitive environment in which entrants are protected and 
can thrive, while allowing a platform to vertically integrate to some 
degree.”107  The authors caution that “[n]on-discrimination requirements 
should be used only after careful study because they can also prevent 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 93. 
 100. Id. 
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 102. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S 596, 600 (1972). 
 103. See Feld, supra note 97, at 94. 
 104. See Hal Singer, How To Tame Big Tech, FORBES (May 8, 2019, 7:01 AM), https:// 
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(explaining how a nondiscrimination standard could be employed for antitrust protections). 
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THE STATE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE (2019), https://research.chicago 
booth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/24UY-65WB]. 
 106. Id. at 77. 
 107. Id. at 93. 
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efficient forms of service that enhance competition.”108  Still other scholars 
advocate for generally increasing enforcement against vertical behavior.109 
Nor is this increased skepticism limited to U.S. stakeholders.  Hostility 
toward big tech behavior writ large has also burgeoned internationally.  
Several recently issued reports, authored or commissioned by foreign 
government agencies, appear to reflect an increasing hostility toward big 
tech growth and integration reminiscent of the inhospitality tradition.110  
These reports seek to develop and articulate theories of potential harm 
arising in, broadly defined, the tech space or digital economy, and to 
provide solutions to purported harms.  Proposals include new rules (like 
prohibiting integration or discrimination and flipping burdens), new 
powers for enforcers, and other policy prescriptions.  Many of the 
recommendations explicitly embrace the notion that, when in doubt, courts 
and enforcers should presume vertical integration is harmful, and 
scrutinize closely proposed justifications. 
EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, for example, commissioned a 
report “to explore how competition policy should evolve to continue to 
promote pro-consumer innovation in the digital age.”111  This report argues 
the error cost framework might need modifications in the digital or tech 
space, and identified specific ways in which such a realignment might be 
accomplished.112  It contends: 
[In this space] one may want to err on the side of disallowing potentially 
anti-competitive conducts, and impose on the incumbent the burden of 
proof for showing the pro-competitiveness of its conduct.  This may be 
true especially where dominant platforms try to expand to neighbouring 
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/EN/Downloads/a/a-new-competition-framework.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc 
/6ARK-S4SB]; DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78
5547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SLB-XDC4]; 
OFCOM, ONLINE MARKET FAILURES AND HARMS (2019), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets 
/pdf_file/0025/174634/online-market-failures-and-harms.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ7Y-AWRV].  
 111. Crémer, de Montjoye & Schweitzer, supra note 110, at 2. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
994 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
markets, thereby growing into digital ecosystems, which become ever 
more difficult for users to leave.113   
In other words, the report argues for an approach clearly hostile to 
actions—especially vertical actions—by tech firms. 
This report makes additional, specific recommendations illustrating 
how this hostility might be accomplished in practice.  For instance, it 
argues that in certain markets, the firm “should bear the burden of proving 
that self-preferencing has no long-run exclusionary effects on product 
markets.”114  Such recommendations disfavoring self-preferencing seem 
consistent with the approach the EU has taken in its recent cases, such as 
its 2017 decision against Google, which concluded that Google unlawfully 
preferenced its own shopping service on its search engine results pages.115 
Similarly, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) issued its Digital Platforms Inquiry Preliminary Report in 
December 2018.116  The ACCC focused its report on analyzing specific 
platforms, particularly Google and Facebook.117  It found there “is a risk 
competition may be hindered due to the vertically integrated nature of 
Google and Facebook, and the fact that they have the ability and incentive 
to favour their own business interests,” as well as a more general “risk that 
digital platforms may favour their own interests.”118  Indeed, the ACCC 
found “[t]he risk of competitive harm increases when the monopoly 
business is vertically integrated.”119  In response, the ACCC noted it “is 
considering recommending a regulatory authority to monitor and report on 
these issues.”120 
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 7. 
 115. See 2017 O.J. (Case AT.39740—Google Search (Shopping)), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1516198535804&uri=CELEX:52018XC0112(01) [https://perma.cc/C8R4 
-AA4M]; see also 2018 O.J. (Case AT.40099—Google Android), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52019XC1128(02) [https://perma.cc/DKK2-9N7R]. 
 116. AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, supra note 110, at 1 (“On 4 December 
2017, the then Treasurer, the Hon Scott Morrison MP, directed the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (the ACCC) to hold an inquiry into the impact of online search engines, social 
media and digital content aggregators (digital platforms) on competition in the media and advertising 
services markets.”).  
 117. Id. at 1–2. 
 118. Id. at 80. 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. Id. at 66.  The report explains further that a “regulatory authority should be tasked to monitor, 
investigate and report on whether digital platforms, which are vertically integrated and meet the 
relevant threshold, are engaging in discriminatory conduct (including, but not limited to, conduct 
which may be anti-competitive) by favouring their own business interests above those of advertisers 
or potentially competing businesses.”  Id. at 81. 
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likewise released a report from its Commission “Competition Law 4.0” in 
September 2019.121  This report “proposes that there should be an EU 
Platform Regulation establishing clear rules of conduct for dominant 
online platforms,” which should  “in particular include a ban on giving 
preferential treatment to the platform operator’s own services over those 
of third parties.”122  Similarly, in a press release accompanying the report, 
one of the chairs of the Commission of Experts, Professor Achim 
Wambach, asserted that “[s]uch [dominant] platforms should be banned 
from giving themselves preferential treatment.”123 
Agencies in the United Kingdom have also issued a couple recent 
reports.  First, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy commissioned a report of outside 
academics assigned to a Digital Competition Expert Panel.124  This report 
focuses less on self-preferencing and vertical integration than some of the 
other reports.  It does, however, recommend the government establish a 
“pro-competition digital markets unit, tasked with securing competition, 
innovation, and beneficial outcomes for consumers and businesses.”125 
Most recently, the United Kingdom communications authority, 
Ofcom, released a report in October 2019, entitled Online Market Failures 
and Harms.126  This report attempts to systematically identify the kinds of 
harms that might arise in digital spaces.  Like the other reports, it 
acknowledges that vertical integration might have some harmful effects.127  
However, it also recognizes that such behaviors may offer very real 
consumers benefits, explaining that, “[i]n some instances, self-
preferencing by a large platform might enable it to enter in the provision 
of a new service in competition with a large incumbent platform.  In such 
a scenario, a blanket ban on self-preferencing for large platforms might 
 
 121. See COMM’N ‘COMPETITION LAW 4.0,’ supra note 110. 
 122. Id. at 2; see also id. at 3 (Recommendation 10 says: “The Commission ‘Competition Law 
4.0’ recommends that dominant online platforms that fall under the Platform Regulation be prohibited 
from favouring their own services in relation to third-party providers unless such preferencing is 
objectively justified.”). 
 123. Press Release, Fed. Ministry for Econ. Affairs & Energy, Commission of Experts on 
Competition Law 4.0 Presents Final Report to Minister Altmaier: A New Competition Framework for 
the Digital Economy (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen 
/2019/20190909-commission-of-experts-on-competition-law-40-presents-final-report-to-minister-alt 
maier.html [https://perma.cc/87NY-VKDJ]. 
 124. DIG. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78
5547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6DH-7F54]. 
 125. Id. at 8. 
 126. See OFCOM, supra note 110. 
 127. Id. ¶ 4.52. 
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reduce rather than enhance competition.”128  Accordingly, this report 
recommends enforcers proceed with care—and not with total hostility—
and rigorously analyze the markets and effects at hand, to avoid making 
such mistakes.129 
These are by no means the only voices in the debate.  There are others 
advocating against the inhospitality tradition, as developed further below.  
But as this discussion elucidates, skepticism and calls for an inhospitality-
based approach to big tech have grown quite loud today. 
III. IS THERE A BIG TECH MARKET FAILURE? 
While the inhospitality-style arguments are particularly cacophonous 
today, they are by no means new—even in the modern era.  Not that long 
ago, there were allegations that companies from AOL130 to MySpace131 to 
Walmart132 were the insurmountable monopolists commanding and 
controlling their respective markets.  The ubiquity of at least two of these 
firms has decreased precipitously over the last several years—and none 
are the primary focus of the current debate.  And perhaps therein lies 
important lessons for today. 
Before delving into an examination of whether the calls to return to 
the inhospitality tradition are warranted, it is important to identify the 
critical first question: Is there evidence of a market failure?  This threshold 
issue must be confronted when attempting to understand whether and 
when intervention may be warranted.  Absent a market failure, there is no 
value-add for antitrust enforcement.133  In other words, if competition is 
 
 128. Id. ¶ 5.16. 
 129. Id. ¶ 5.17. 
 130. See, e.g., AOL’s Instant Messaging Monopoly?, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2000, 2:00 AM), https:// 
www.wired.com/2000/12/aols-instant-messaging-monopoly/ [https://perma.cc/4GCK-RREK]; Joe 
Salkowski, AOL May Also Have Monopoly, CHI. TRIB. (June 19, 2000), https://www.chicagotribune 
.com/news/ct-xpm-2000-06-19-0006190010-story.html [https://perma.cc/7FP9-6S7S]. 
 131. See, e.g., Victor Keegan, Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2007, 
7:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/feb/08/business.comment [https://perma 
.cc/9RMW-GWEM]. 
 132. See, e.g., Barry C. Lynn, The Case for Breaking Up Walmart, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 29, 2013, 
3:00 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/the-case-for-breaking-up-walmart/ [https://perma 
.cc/3RLT-ZJXY]. 
 133. Note that, even the presence of a market failure alone is not sufficient for government action; 
it should also be demonstrated that the benefits of government action would outweigh the costs.  See, 
e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“The American people deserve a 
regulatory system that works for them, not against them: a regulatory system that protects and 
improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being and improves the performance of the 
economy without imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society . . . .  Federal agencies 
should promulgate only such regulations as are . . . made necessary by compelling public need, such 
as material failures of private markets . . . .”); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 56 J.L. & 
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functioning as it should, then increasing or changing how antitrust 
regulates the underlying market would not improve upon the status quo. 
To understand whether there is, in fact, a market failure, requires an 
understanding of the empirical effects of firm behavior in the big-tech 
space.  While the critics and reports cited above attempt thoroughly to 
consider the potential theories by which big tech firms may be harming 
competition, they have yet to identify any systematic, or other empirical, 
evidence that anticompetitive effects are manifesting.  A focus on empirics 
is critical—particularly when calls to alter the foundational rules 
governing industries are under consideration—because, as Judge 
Easterbrook has explained: 
[T]he world of economic theory is full of “existence theorems”—proofs 
that under certain conditions ordinarily-beneficial practices could have 
undesirable consequences.  But we cannot live by existence theorems. 
The costs of searching for these undesirable examples are high.  The 
costs of deterring beneficial conduct (a byproduct of any search for the 
undesirable examples) are high.134 
That is, existence theorems are not, and cannot be, sufficient to justify 
legal action.  Existence theorems may or may not bear out in the real world.  
And so action based upon such theorems may or may not benefit 
consumers.  Consumers deserve better than “maybe,” particularly when 
that maybe comes—as it must—at a cost to them.135 
To avoid basing a—potentially incredibly costly—regulatory regime 
upon existence theorems rather than upon reality, and to avoid falling 
victim to over—and erroneous—reliance upon monopoly explanations, 
we must rigorously examine the empirics and act only when real-world 
evidence suggests doing so will benefit consumers.  This Part reviews the 
empirical literature examining the consumer welfare effects in big tech and 
of vertical arrangements, as well as the implications of these literatures. 
 
ECON. 837, 853 (2013) [hereinafter Coase, Problem of Social Cost] (republishing the original article, 
first published in 1960) (“All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that government 
regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm.  
Satisfactory views on policy can come only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, 
firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects . . . .  It is my belief that economists, 
and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from 
governmental regulation.”). 
 134. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 15. 
 135. Any government action comes with costs, which consumers (or taxpayers) fund.  Correctly 
stopping harmful conduct may be worth that cost; but incorrectly condemning conduct is almost 
certainly not. 
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A. Consumer Welfare Effects in Big Tech 
Thus far in the debate, critics have focused primarily upon articulating 
the possible theories that could underpin antitrust liability.136  These efforts 
have been thoughtful and comprehensive.  It is important for regulators 
and other experts to consider what theories may be at play, particularly in 
novel or innovative markets, where such harms may not be self-evident. 
However, the efforts so far have failed in a respect critical to enforcers: 
that is, they often jump from the identified existence theorems to proposed 
remedies without empirical evidence to corroborate their theorems.  This 
jump is particularly problematic when the remedies proposed are not 
focused to a specific instance of alleged harm, but rather would alter the 
fundamental legal responsibilities and liabilities of firms in a given 
industry. 
The critics’ arguments and reports largely advocate for a return to the 
inhospitality tradition,137 but what does the evidence actually support?  
There has been some very important, interesting work examining 
consumer welfare in the big tech space.  Erik Brynjolfsson and his co-
authors, for instance, have deployed “massive online choice experiments 
to measure changes in [consumer] well-being.”138  Their efforts attempt to 
measure consumer surplus deriving from various big tech products and 
services.139  As they explain, consumer surplus may be a better measure of 
effects because, in this space, goods and services are often discounted or 
even zero-price.140  GDP and other productivity statistics that rely upon 
consumer prices fail to capture the value of such goods and services, and 
so they tend to misestimate actual well-being.141  Indeed, Brynjolfsson and 
his coauthors “find that digital goods generate a large amount of consumer 
welfare that is currently not captured in GDP.”142 
Their experiments estimate willingness to accept (WTA) valuations, 
that is, the monetary value needed to compensate consumers for their loss 
 
 136. See supra Part II. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Using Massive Online Choice Experiments to Measure Changes in 
Well-Being, 116 PNAS 7250, 7250 (2019) [hereinafter Brynjolfsson et al., Using Massive Online 
Choice Experiments]; see also Erik Brynjolfsson et al., GDP-B: Accounting for the Value of New and 
Free Goods in the Digital Economy 2–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25695, 
2019), https://www.gwern.net/docs/economics/2019-brynjolfsson.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UWP-
HGJE] (expanding on Massive Online Choice Experiments to determine Facebook’s impact on welfare 
growth). 
 139. See sources cited supra note 138. 
 140. See Brynjolfsson et al., Using Massive Online Choice Experiments, supra note 138, at 7250. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
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of access to various goods.143  As demonstrated in Table 1 below, 
consumers’ WTA valuations for various online goods and services are 
significant.144  For instance, in 2017 consumers would demand over 
$17,500 to lose access to search engines for one year; and they would 
demand well over $1,100 to lose access to video services per year.145  As 
the authors note, consumers tend to pay only about $120 to $240 per year 
for access to online video services—so their measure indicates “the 
surplus the median consumers receive from these goods is a 5 to 10 
multiple of what they actually pay.”146  These measures suggest the 
consumer surplus deriving from various digital services is remarkable.  
 Other empirical work tends to support these impressive findings.  For 
instance, a 2019 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working 
paper found the “median and mean willingness-to-accept to deactivate 
Facebook for weeks 1-4 were $100 and $180, respectively.”147  It further 
found that “[m]ultiplying the mean by the approximately 172 million US 
Facebook users . . . impl[ied] that 27 days of Facebook generates $31 
billion of consumer surplus.”148  Another study estimated that, even using 
the “most conservative of [its] mean WTA estimates, if applied to 
Facebook’s 214 million U.S. users, suggest[ed] an annual value of over 
$240 billion to users.”149  Similarly, a 2016 NBER working paper used 
nearly 50 million individual-level observations from four U.S. cities and 
regression analysis to examine the effects of Uber.150  It found that in 2015, 
 
 143. Id. at 7251. 
 144. Id. at 7252 tbl.1. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 7252. 
 147. Hunt Allcott et al., The Welfare Effects of Social Media 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 25514, 2019). 
 148. Id. at 32. 
 149. Jay R. Corrigan et al., How Much Is Social Media Worth? Estimating the Value of Facebook 
by Paying Users to Stop Using It, 13 PLOS ONE, Dec. 2018, at 1, 7. 
 150. Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber 4 (Nat’l 
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alone, the UberX service generated nearly $2.9 billion in consumer surplus 
in just those cities—and that a rough calculation implied “that the overall 
consumer surplus generated by the UberX service in the United States in 
2015 was $6.8 billion.”151 
Even earlier empirical analyses of (comparatively) modest 
developments in digital goods and services produce astounding estimates 
of consumer surplus.  Here again, Brynjolfsson and his coauthors offer 
valuable insights.  They conducted a study to analyze the “economic 
impact of increased product variety” that online sellers made possible.152  
While they acknowledge that efficiency gains from increased competition 
such websites might provide itself contributed to consumer surplus, their 
“research show[ed] that increased product variety made available through 
electronic markets can be a significantly larger source of consumer surplus 
gains.”153  They note the number of different books available on Amazon 
at the time was more than twenty-three times larger than the number on 
the shelves at a typical Barnes & Noble, and about fifty-seven times 
greater than the number of books in a typical large, independent 
bookstore.154  Analyzing the “increased product variety of online 
bookstores,” they found this increase “enhanced consumer welfare by 
$731 million to $1.03 billion in the year 2000, which [was] between 7 and 
10 times as large as the consumer welfare gain from increased competition 
and lower prices in this market.”155  And an earlier study analyzing the 
value of broadband found that “[c]onsumers receive more than $30 billion 
of net benefits from the use of fixed-line broadband at home.”156 
To the extent modern criticisms focus upon alleged effects to 
inequality or democracy—which many do157—other empirical studies 
demonstrate the disproportionate benefits that can flow to less wealthy 
consumers when businesses offer lower prices and easier access.  Jason 
 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers 
/w22627.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5KV-55BN]. 
 151. Id. at 16. 
 152. Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of 
Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1580, 1580 (2003). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Mark Dutz et al., The Substantial Consumer Benefits of Broadband Connectivity for U.S. 
Households, COMPASS LEXECON (July 2009), https://www.compasslexecon.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2018/04/Consumer_benefits_of_Broadband.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CGM-VWTQ]. 
 157. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6 (“Today’s big tech companies have too much power—too 
much power over our economy, our society, and our democracy.”); Khan supra note 7, at 767 & 
throughout (discussing the “political risks associated with Amazon’s market dominance”); Khan & 
Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 238 (arguing that modern antitrust enforcement “has permitted large 
corporations to dominate our markets and politics” and contributed to economic inequality). 
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Furman, for instance, examined the effects of Wal-Mart on U.S. 
households.158  He found that “[p]lausible estimates of the magnitude of 
the savings from Wal-Mart are enormous—a total of $263 billion in 2004, 
or $2,329 per household.”159  Moreover, he noted that lower-income 
households disproportionately benefit from the presence of Wal-Mart, as 
demonstrated in the table below.160  Because families with lower incomes 
devote higher percentages of their income to staples, like food, than higher 
income families, they benefit more from being able to purchase lower-
priced food at Wal-Mart.161 















Bottom Quintile $8,201 $2,119 25.8% $530 6.5% 
Second Quintile $21,478 $2,713 12.6% $678 3.2% 
Third Quintile $37,542 $3,114 8.3% $779 2.1% 
Fourth Quintile $61,132 $3,726 6.1% $932 1.5% 
Top Quintile $127,146 $4,503 3.5% $1,126 0.9% 
All $51,128 $3,129 6.1% $782 1.5% 
Source: Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 2005, Consumer Expenditures in 2003 and 
author’s calculations. 
One might imagine that digital products and services—like search 
engines, email, and ecommerce—which often offer increased product 
variety, lower prices, increased ease of use (i.e., less time consumers must 
devote to accomplishing their goals)—would likewise disproportionately 
benefit those most sensitive to price and leisure-time constraints.  Risking 
these benefits by fundamentally altering the legal framework governing 
the companies from which these benefits derive could, then, be extremely 
costly to those who can least afford it. 
These and other studies strongly demonstrate that digital markets 
are—and have been for several years—yielding significant consumer 
benefits.  Of course, these findings do not indicate that such markets are 
entirely free from anticompetitive activity.  But they do suggest a very 
different starting point than advocates of a new inhospitality tradition 
 
 158. Jason Furman, Wal-Mart: A Progressive Success Story 1 (2005), https://www.mackinac.org 
/archives/2006/walmart.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZX2-GH8V]. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 3 tbl.1. 
 161. Id. at 3.  Furman also notes that, “Even if you grant that Wal-Mart hurts workers in the retail 
sector—and the evidence for this is far from clear—the magnitude of any potential harm is small in 
comparison [to the estimated $263 billion benefits in 2004].  One study, for example, found that the 
‘Wal-Mart effect’ lowered retail wages by $4.7 billion in 2000.”  Id. at 1.  This reduction is wages 
represents less than 2% of the benefits Furman estimates. 
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would seem to accept.  The immense consumer benefits strongly indicate 
these markets have remained incredibly competitive and valuable sources 
of consumer welfare for decades.  It is always possible that consumer 
welfare benefits would be even greater if certain, allegedly 
anticompetitive, conduct were not present.  But that is a very different 
argument—and suggests a very different set of remedies—than a new 
inhospitality tradition would embrace. 
B. Consumer Welfare Effects of Vertical Arrangements 
Vertical integration has been one of the more frequently empirically 
investigated phenomena in modern industrial organization.  Vertical 
integration and expansion are not new.  The existence of such conduct is 
essentially coextensive with the existence of firms themselves.162  So long 
as there have been firms, they have tried to discern new ways to serve 
consumer demand—which invariably entails vertical growth of some sort. 
Even “self-preferencing” or “discrimination” is not new.  It is a 
common business model for brick-and-mortar stores to sell their own 
private label (or generic) brands alongside brand-name products (recall 
Topco).163  These businesses often offer their own products to consumers 
at lower, more favorable prices than brand-names—after all, they have the 
information regarding what brands will charge and can adapt their prices 
accordingly.  Moreover, they often favor their own products in-store: they 
tend to give preferential shelf space to their own products and to flag their 
products with brightly colored advertisements showcasing their 
comparability to the brand-name products and their lower prices.164  
Economists have studied this behavior extensively, and—as with the 
benefits of vertical integration the Supreme Court has frequently 
acknowledged165—recognized that this conduct frequently has potential 
procompetitive rationales.166  Brick-and-mortar stores have even found 
 
 162. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 397–98 & n.5 (1937). 
 163. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 164. Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON. 
421, 426–27 (2007). 
 165. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007); Bus. 
Elecs., Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988); Cont’l Television, Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51, 55–56 (1977).  
 166. See, e.g., Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 162, at 388–89; R.H. Coase, Industrial 
Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 ECONOMIC RESEARCH: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
(Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration Production: Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 118 (1971); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 324 
(1978); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Integration As a Self-Enforcing Contractual 
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ways to incorporate such favorable treatment into their online stores.  For 
instance, searches for “ibuprofen” of CVS’s website tend to return results 
first for CVS’s store brand variety, followed by brand-name offerings.167  
In the online space, available empirical evidence tends to suggest that self-
preferencing is likewise not the result of, or an abuse of, market power; 
but instead, like its real-world counterparts, tends to represent efforts by 
firms to better satisfy consumer demands.168 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the ubiquity of vertical arrangements, 
numerous economists have devoted several studies (and meta-studies) to 
enhancing our understanding of how vertical arrangements affect 
consumer welfare.  These studies repeatedly find that vertical 
arrangements tend to be procompetitive or competitively neutral.169  
 
Arrangement, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 415–16 (1997); Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and 
the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105, 115–17 (2000); Klein & Wright, supra note 164, at 426–
27; Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusive 
Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010); see also 
Timothy Bresnahan & Jonathan Levin, Vertical Integration and Market Structure, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012) (summarizing the 
literature). 
 167. Searches for over-the-counter pharmaceutical drugs provide particularly good points of 
comparison because, by definition, the generic and brand-name products will be the same. 
 168. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1163, 1193–97 (2012); Joshua D. Wright, Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some 
Preliminary Evidence 2 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-14, 2011); 
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In re Google Inc., 
FTC File No. 111-0163, at 3 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public 
_statements/statement-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V86J-3M2N] (explaining that it found no evidence Google’s alleged “search 
bias” had harmed consumers because, while some websites that could be considered competitors to 
Google were demoted, “[o]n the other hand, these changes to Google’s search algorithm could 
reasonably be viewed as improving the overall quality of Google’s search results because the first 
search page now presented the user with a greater diversity of websites”). 
 169. See, e.g., Glob. Antitrust Inst., Antonin Scalia Law Sch., Comment Submitted in the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Vertical 
Mergers 8 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://gai.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2018/09/GAI-Comment 
-on-Vertical-Mergers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VM2-VE78] [hereinafter GAI Comment 2018] (“In sum, 
these papers from 2009-2018 continue to support the conclusions from Lafontaine & Slade (2007) and 
Cooper et al. (2005) that consumers mostly benefit from vertical integration. While vertical integration 
can certainly foreclose rivals in theory, there is only limited empirical evidence supporting that finding 
in real markets.”); Glob. Antitrust Inst., Antonin Scalia Law Sch., Comment on DOJ/FTC Draft 2020 
Vertical Merger Guidelines 14 [hereinafter GAI Comment 2020] (updating that analysis); Francine 
Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and 
Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391, 409 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (“[I]t 
appears that when manufacturers choose to impose such [vertical] restraints, not only do they make 
themselves better off but they also typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality products 
and better service provision.”); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm 
Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 677 (2007) [hereinafter Lafontaine & Slade, 
Vertical Integration] (“The data appear to be telling us that efficiency considerations overwhelm 
anticompetitive motives in most contexts.  Furthermore, even when we limit attention to natural 
monopolies or tight oligopolies, the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not strong.”); Daniel P. 
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Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade, for instance, conducted a meta-
analysis of dozens of empirical studies published between the 1960s and 
2000s.170  They found compelling evidence that “under most 
circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration decisions are 
efficient, not just from the firms’ but also from the consumers’ points of 
view.”171  Their review found only “isolated studies that contradict[ed] this 
claim,” while the “vast majority support[ed] it.”172 
Lafontaine and Slade’s analysis yielded two additional insights critical 
to the current discussion.  First, they found that “even in industries that are 
highly concentrated . . . the net effect of vertical integration appears to be 
positive in many instances.”173  And second, they found “clear evidence 
that restrictions on vertical integration . . . are usually detrimental to 
consumers.”174  Indeed, they note that “consumers are often worse off 
when governments require vertical separation in markets where firms 
would have chosen otherwise.”175  This would seem to present a strong 
caution against ill-conceived government intervention. 
Similarly, several current and former antitrust enforcers—James 
Cooper, Luke Froeb, Dan O’Brien, and Michael Vita—reviewed several 
empirical pieces on vertical restraints and vertical integration.176  They 
found “two features immediately st[oo]d out: First, there is a paucity of 
support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical integration are 
 
O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorems, in THE 
PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 76 (2008) (“With few exceptions, the literature does 
not support the view that these [vertical integration] practices are used for anticompetitive reasons.  
This literature supports a fairly strong prior belief that these practices are unlikely to be anti-
competitive in most cases.”). 
 170. See generally Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169. 
 171. Id. at 680. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 663. 
 176. Cooper et al., supra note 66.  Cooper has held multiple positions at the FTC, including Deputy 
Director for Economic Analysis in the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and Deputy and Acting 
Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning.  See Dr. James C. Cooper, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, 
https://fedsoc.org/contributors/james-c-cooper [https://perma.cc/4X4W-76TU] (last visited Apr. 8, 
2020).  Froeb recently served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division; he also served as Director of the Bureau of Economics at the FTC.  See Division 
Update Spring 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-
operations/division-update-spring-2018/meet-front-office [https://perma.cc/B9JC-JWR6].  O’Brien is 
“a former Senior Economic Policy Adviser and Deputy Director of the [FTC]’s Bureau of Economics, 
and former Chief of the Economic Regulatory Section at the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division.”  See Daniel P. O’Brien, COMPASS LEXICON, https://www.compasslexecon.com 
/professionals/daniel-p-obrien/ [https://perma.cc/97PS-ZUX5] (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).  Vita is 
Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics.  See Michael G. Vita, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/michael-g-vita [https://perma.cc/47AJ-VL5B] (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2020). 
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likely to harm consumers. . . .  Second, a far greater number of studies 
found that the use of vertical restraints in the particular context studied 
improved welfare unambiguously (i.e., resulted in lower prices and larger 
quantities).”177  The Global Antitrust Institute recently updated the 
empirical literature reviews, to similar result.178  Its review examined about 
a dozen empirical studies released between 2008 and 2018, concluding 
that “recent empirical evidence continues to support the proposition that 
vertical integration generates abundant efficiencies and is generally 
procompetitive.”179 
Some criticisms today focus upon the shortcomings in the empirical 
literature.  There is no doubt that determining the consumer welfare effects 
of the conduct under examination can be difficult.  But the body of 
literature, as a whole, presents a compelling case.180  Other criticisms rely 
heavily upon the studies finding harm to consumer welfare, arguing that 
recent empirical work indicates harm manifests more often than enforcers 
suppose, and that this work supports a change to current law enforcement 
approaches.181  But, as discussed, recent reviews of the empirical literature 
continue to support the belief that harmful outcomes are exceptions to the 
weight of the empirical literature.182  If the choice is between basing policy 
on a healthy skepticism and wholistic view of the empirical literature, or 
dismissing the substantial literature and relying instead upon fears that the 
bulk of the literature does not support, the better policy approach seems 
clear.  Moreover, such exceptions suggest, at most, marginally more 
vertical arrangements should be challenged.  They do not warrant 
prohibiting or presuming such arrangements to be unlawful. 
Accordingly, the existing empirical literature on vertical arrangements 
poses very real challenges to adopting the inhospitality approach in big 
tech.  First, the weight of the empirical literature demonstrates most 
 
 177. Cooper et al., supra note 66, at 648. 
 178. GAI Comment 2018, supra note 170, at 5–9 (“In sum, these papers from 2009-2018 continue 
to support the conclusions from Lafontaine & Slade (2007) and Cooper et al. (2005) that consumers 
mostly benefit from vertical integration.”). 
 179. Id. at 12; see also GAI Comment 2020, supra note 170, at 14 (“While vertical integration can 
certainly foreclose rivals in theory, there is only limited empirical evidence supporting that finding in 
real markets.”).  GAI originally identified thirteen studies, eleven of which allowed inferences 
regarding welfare effects.  Id. at 6–7.  GAI later removed one study because “it did not involve a 
vertical component to the examined merger.”  Id. at 12 n.30.  
 180. Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169, at 631 (“Since those issues are not 
always dealt with satisfactorily, one can be skeptical about some of the conclusions that authors have 
reached.  Nevertheless, taken as a body, the evidence is often so strong that it can overcome much of 
our skepticism.”). 
 181. See Salop, supra note 109, at 1987 n.103. 
 182. See GAI Comment 2018, supra note 169, at 12; see also GAI Comment 2020, supra note 
169, at 17 (“[T]he proposed VMGs reject presumptions of illegality or legality in favor of a case-by-
case approach.”). 
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vertical arrangements will benefit (or at least not harm) consumers.183  The 
policy implications of these findings are—as the authors of the literature 
reviews have repeatedly acknowledged—that antitrust enforcers should 
continue to bear the burden to prove harm is likely in the cases in which 
they seek to act.184  Shifting the foundation of the antitrust laws to tilt 
against arrangements that tend to yield consumer benefits would eliminate 
significant consumer value without significant countervailing benefits.185 
Second, we do not have a robust framework to identify ex ante which 
vertical arrangements are among the rare ones likely to harm competition, 
and which fall into the broader category of being procompetitive or 
competitively neutral.  Empirical evidence does not provide clear insights.  
And theory on the likely effects of vertical arrangements likewise fails to 
provide decisive guidance.  The very same factors that make foreclosure 
more likely (such as market power) also tend to make efficiencies more 
likely.  Lafontaine and Slade’s analysis demonstrated that even in highly 
concentrated industries (i.e., industries where market power is likely 
present), positive welfare effects were frequently observed.186  Many of 
the arguments in favor of condemning vertical arrangements in the big tech 
space today rely upon the alleged existence of market power—but here 
again, the empirical evidence fails to suggest that the presence of market 
power, alone, is a sufficient basis to condemn vertical relationships.187  
Given the state of both the theoretical literature—which cannot predict ex 
ante which arrangements will likely be harmful—and the empirical 
literature—which suggests harmful results are quite rare—there remains 
no compelling basis for adopting rules that would categorically eliminate 
 
 183. See, e.g., GAI Comment 2018, supra note 169, at 5–9. 
 184. Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169 at 680 (“We therefore conclude that, 
faced with a vertical arrangement, the burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities 
to demonstrate that that arrangement is harmful before the practice is attacked.”); see also GAI 
Comment 2020, supra note 169, at 14 (“The results continue to suggest that the modern antitrust 
approach to vertical mergers should reflect the empirical reality that vertical relationships are generally 
procompetitive or neutral.”); GAI Comment 2018, supra note 169, at 8–9 (same); Cooper et al., supra 
note 66, at 639 (“Thus, absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint’s effect, an 
optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.”); 
O’Brien, supra note 169 at 82 (“Thus, my own view, based largely on a Hippocratic philosophy of 
non-intervention absent good evidence that intervention will have benefits, is that direct evidence of 
likely harm should be required before condemning a vertical practice.  If there were a Hippocratic 
Oath among antitrust practitioners, this is where a scientific approach would lead.”). 
 185. Even for those vertical contracts that studies deemed competitively neutral might very well 
have some benefits to the economy, as a whole.  For instance, if a vertically integrated firm is able to 
lower its costs, even if those lower costs are not directly passed on to consumers, they are real 
nonetheless and have positive benefits somewhere (without any harm to consumers). 
 186. Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169, at 680 (“[E]ven in industries that 
are highly concentrated so that horizontal considerations assume substantial importance, the net effect 
of vertical integration appears to be positive in many industries.”). 
 187. See sources cited supra note 169. 
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or presumptively condemn vertical arrangements. 
Third, the empirical evidence to date fails to demonstrate, or even to 
suggest, that vertical arrangements in the big tech space are more likely to 
yield harmful effects than they are in any other industry.  In other words, 
the empirical literature today does not support the notion that we should 
be any more skeptical of vertical arrangements in the big tech space than 
in any other space.  In turn, this again underscores that enforcers have no 
sound, empirical basis for establishing different laws, standards, or 
presumptions regarding vertical arrangements in the big tech space today. 
IV. SOONER OR LATER I’M GREATER THAN YOU188 
The drive to be the best, to be the market leader, to command a 
presence that competitors cannot ignore, is critical to the proper 
functioning of the American economy.  The inhospitality approach 
undermined this very drive, and was abandoned in response.  But today, 
the inhospitality approach threatens a resurgence, particularly with respect 
to vertical (or nonhorizontal) growth.  Such a resurgence portends 
significant losses to consumer welfare, both directly—as vertical 
arrangements that would benefit consumers are no longer realized—and 
indirectly—as the competitive pressures that such arrangements would 
introduce are not realized, either.  The latter, losses to indirect, dynamic 
competition, may be especially costly to consumers.  This Part considers 
a case example that would be directly impacted by a new inhospitality 
approach in big tech—the “streaming wars”—before turning to final 
considerations of the analysis presented in this Article and how best to 
preserve the competitive drive that is critical to our economy. 
A. The Streaming Wars: A Case Example of Vertical Competition and 
Big Tech 
The discussion in this Article so far has abstained from engaging in an 
examination of just how competitive firms in the big tech space may be—
that is, how aggressively they are competing on the merits to innovate and 
to better anticipate and satisfy customer demands.  Any thorough analysis 
is outside the scope of this Article.  But before concluding, a bit of 
anecdotal analysis can provide some insights and help to elucidate the very 
real consumer benefits that are at play—and which are often lost in the 
discussion presented by those adopting a more hostile approach. 
A very recent example of competition driven in no small part by 
 
 188. Berlin, supra note 1. 
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vertical arrangements and big tech is the so-called streaming wars, which 
has come to denote the rapidly increasing competitive pressure among 
services offering streaming for television and movies.  As The Verge 
reported: “The planned launch of Disney+ in November 2019 is ushering 
in a whole new era of streaming, one where established industry leaders 
like Netflix, Hulu, HBO Go, and Amazon Prime Video are facing growing 
competition from major new players in the industry.”189  What is 
interesting about the streaming wars for the current discussion is that it 
involves a tremendous amount of vertical repositioning and other vertical 
arrangements.  Cable, telecom, and broadcast television companies like 
Comcast and NBCUniversal (Peacock),190 Cox, AT&T TimeWarner, and 
CBS are all positioning to compete—in some cases entering into vertical 
arrangements to facilitate this positioning.191  Incumbents like HBO are 
repositioning in response.192  Others are expanding their offerings: CBS 
All Access recently added content available only on its app; ESPN+ offers 
exclusive content; and PBS Passport offers extended access to public 
television content.193 
Big tech companies like Amazon, Apple, and Google are also critical 
competitive pressures in this space.  Amazon launched its first video 
service in 2006 and has recently ramped up its spending on original 
 
 189. Streaming Wars, THE VERGE, https://www.theverge.com/streaming-wars [https://perma.cc 
/LVU8-76GS] (last visited Apr. 8, 2020); see also Sonia Saraiya, TV Is Dead. Long Live TV, VANITY 
FAIR (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2019/11/tv-is-dead-long-live-tv-
disney-netflix-hbomax-apple [https://perma.cc/84BN-S5KL] (“The Content Wars have reached full 
pitch, and they’re changing television forever.”). 
 190. Julia Alexander, NBC’s Peacock Streaming Service Will Launch on July 15th with Three 
Different Price Tiers, THE VERGE (Jan. 16, 2020, 4:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1 
/16/21068607/nbc-peacock-streaming-service-price-launch-date-ads-universal-comcast-office-harry 
-potter [https://perma.cc/PTV8-KC9A]. 
 191. See, e.g., Dieter Bohn, The Streaming Wars Have Barely Started and They’re Already 
Exhausting, THE VERGE (Jan. 17, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/17/21069703 
/streaming-wars-peacock-subscription-fatigue-exhaustion-apple-hbo-hulu-netflix-quibi-disney-augh 
[https://perma.cc/3XRX-7VSM]; Alex Sherman, Disney+ Isn’t Really the Beginning of the Streaming 
Wars—the Next Year Is Just a Warm-Up, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2019, 9:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com 
/2019/11/16/disney-plus-streaming-wars-just-warming-up.html [https://perma.cc/D2PG-B3HG]. 
 192. See Nick Perry & Chris Gates, What Is HBO Max?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/what-is-hbo-max/ [https://perma.cc/P2UT-TYHH] 
(“Competition between streaming services will get even stiff now that AT&T’s WarnerMedia has 
announced plans to launch the newly dubbed HBO Max.”). 
 193. See John Callaham, CBS All Access Shows: All Current and Future Exclusive Series, 
ANDROID AUTHORITY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.androidauthority.com/cbs-all-access-shows 
-1022653/ [https://perma.cc/47MN-NKM7]; Nick Hastings, ESPN+: Everything You Need to Know 
About ESPN’s Streaming Service, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:46 AM), https://www.business 
insider.com/what-is-espn-plus [https://perma.cc/2RCD-Y9BE]; What Is PBS Passport?, PBS (Mar. 
24, 2020, 1:31 PM), https://help.pbs.org/support/solutions/articles/12000043556-what-is-pbs 
-passport- [https://perma.cc/LG5W-57XE]. 
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content.194  Apple recently launched its Apple TV Plus product, with its 
own original content.195  Google offers YouTube, with numerous original 
channels, and YouTube TV for streaming live broadcast television 
content.196 
What would the streaming wars look like under an inhospitality 
tradition?  While it is difficult to say precisely, it is almost certainly the 
case that it would look nothing like what we see today.  Depending upon 
how expansively the new inhospitality approach was embraced, it could 
prohibit Amazon from offering original content—or from offering video 
services at all; Apple from introducing its Apple TV Plus product, which 
also includes original content today; or Google from offering YouTube 
TV or otherwise expanding its YouTube services.  If applied more broadly, 
the approach could also prohibit firms like Disney and ESPN, HBO, 
Comcast and NBCUniversal, and more from expanding their offerings. 
The new inhospitality approach espouses extreme suspicion of vertical 
arrangements or growth by “large” or “powerful” firms—and all these 
firms would seem to fit those categories as proponents define them. 
It seems far from certain that, by prohibiting all this repositioning and 
growth, a new inhospitality approach would foster competition or 
consumer benefits in this space.  To the contrary, it seems likely that this 
approach could very well have prevented a significant amount of 
competition—and the commensurate consumer benefits—that we are 
experiencing today.  It is widely recognized, for instance, that Disney+’s 
entry into the field helped put the “streaming wars” into overdrive.197  But 
a new inhospitality regime would likely have prevented that entry.  
Moreover, many of the new or expanding services offer original or 
exclusive content that is considered very high quality—and which, in turn, 
puts pressure on other streaming services (not to mention on more 
traditional cable TV and Hollywood studios) to produce better content.  
Apple TV Plus, for instance, received its first Golden Globe nomination 
 
 194. Jason Del Rey, The Making of Amazon Prime, the Internet’s Most Successful and Devastating 
Membership Program, VOX (May 3, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/3 
/18511544/amazon-prime-oral-history-jeff-bezos-one-day-shipping [https://perma.cc/63PW-SJJ4]; 
Eugene Kim, Amazon on Pace to Spend $7 Billion on Video and Music Content This Year, According 
to New Disclosure, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/amazon-on 
-pace-to-spend-7-billion-on-video-and-music-content.html [https://perma.cc/LG62-4XB6]. 
 195. Nick Pino et al., Apple TV Plus Cost, Shows, Channels, Devices, and Everything You Need to 
Know, TECH RADAR (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.techradar.com/news/apple-tv-plus-cost-review 
-and-everything-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/P75R-WU44]. 
 196. See Josh Levenson & Simon Cohen, What Is YouTube TV? Here’s Everything You Need to 
Know, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/what-is 
-youtube-tv/ [https://perma.cc/BB3N-VWB7]; Channels, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user 
/YouTube/channels [https://perma.cc/LSX9-H7U2] (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). 
 197. See, e.g., Streaming Wars, supra note 189. 
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just months after launching.198  In other words, the “streaming wars” today 
involve competition not just for the provision of streaming services 
themselves—driving firms to seek better options for streaming, rendering 
it faster, with more options like off-line viewing options—but also for 
content. 
A new inhospitality approach would likely hamper all those aspects of 
competition.  This would constitute no small amount of welfare impaired.  
Recall that recent estimates of the consumer welfare benefits of online 
video services was a five to ten multiple of what consumers actually paid 
in 2017, amounting to over $1,100 a year per consumer, before the 
“streaming wars” really even heated up.199 
B. Preserving Competitive Drives 
Maintaining fierce competition is critical.  On that point, at least, all 
voices in the debate seem to agree.  Where the vigorous disagreement 
arises is with regard to how antitrust policy and enforcement efforts can, 
in fact, foster that competition.  This Article argues that an approach based 
upon the best available empirical evidence and experience is warranted—
and precludes the hostile approach proponents of a new inhospitality 
tradition would embrace.  At this point in our antitrust enforcement 
journey, we are fortunate to have both empirical studies of industries and 
behaviors as well as experience with an earlier inhospitality regime upon 
which to base our policies and decisions. 
That mere existence theorems are insufficient bases for sound policy 
 
 198. Sarah Perez, Apple TV+ Picks Up First Golden Globe Nominations, While Netflix Leads 
Across Film and TV, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2019, 9:07 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/09 
/apple-tv-picks-up-first-golden-globe-nominations-while-netflix-across-film-and-tv/ [https://perma 
.cc/9DLH-MZKW]. 
 199. Brynjolfsson et al., Massive Online Choice Experiments, supra note 138, at 7252. 
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or enforcement decisions is clear200—and consistent with the case law.201  
Indeed, when ruling on the merits of cases before them, courts have 
repeatedly noted that “antitrust theory and speculation cannot trump 
facts.”202  If we are to embrace the common sense notion that policy and 
enforcement should be based upon real world evidence, the inhospitality 
approach to vertical arrangements simply cannot be accepted.  As 
discussed, the empirical literature to date does not support wide-sweeping 
 
 200. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 15 (“[W]e cannot live by existence theorems.”); 
O’Brien, supra note 169, at 81 (“The theoretical literature on vertical practices over the past 25 years 
has generated numerous possibility theorems regarding the possible effects of vertical practices.  
However, possibility theorems without more do not provide a good basis for policy.”); Margaret E. 
Slade, The Effects of Vertical Restraints: An Evidence Based Approach, in THE PROS AND CONS OF 
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Competition Law Center, Beijing, China: Evidence-Based Antitrust Enforcement in the Technology 
Sector, at 4-5 (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements 
/evidence-based-antitrust-enforcement-technology-sector/130223chinaevidence.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/5DNB-REZ4] (“We, as antitrust enforcers, are best served by welcoming and even encouraging the 
development of new theoretical models and tools while also demanding evidence that these models 
are reliable predictors of actual firm behavior before they are implemented through enforcement 
actions.”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, nominee, Supreme Court of the United States) (“I think on the one 
hand it is clear that antitrust law needs to take account of economic theory and economic 
understandings, but it needs to do so in a careful way and to make sure that it does so in a way that is 
consistent with the purposes of the antitrust laws, which is to ensure competition, which is, as you say, 
to be a real charter of economic liberty.”). 
 201. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (holding that, even at the 
motion to dismiss stage, “mere possibility” is not enough); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622–23 & n.22 (1974) (“But it is to be remembered that [Section] 7 [of the Clayton 
Act] deals in ‘probabilities,’ not ‘ephemeral possibilities.’” (quoting Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 323 (1962))); United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(“Section 7 [of the Clayton Act] involves probabilities.”). 
 202. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2004); see also State of N.Y. v. 
Deutsche Telekom, AG, 19-5434, slip op. at 136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020) (quoting Arch Coal, 329 
F. Supp. 2d at 116–17) (same); FTC v. RAG-Stiftung, No. 19-2337, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2020) 
(quoting Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17) (same); FTC v. Tronox Ltd., 332 F. Supp. 3d 187, 
197 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 116) (same); United States v. AT&T Inc., 
310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 190 (D.D.C. 2018) (same) (quoting Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17) 
(same); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 37 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Arch Coal, 329 F. 
Supp. 2d at 116–17) (same). 
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changes to the antitrust law on vertical arrangements.203  Neither the 
literature broadly examining the welfare effects of online or big tech 
products and services nor the literature analyzing the effects of vertical 
arrangements suggest that something is fundamentally amiss. 
Quite to the contrary, the combined evidence would tend to suggest 
that rules prohibiting or presumptively condemning vertical arrangements 
in big tech are not only unwarranted, but are, in fact, likely to destroy 
significant consumer value.  Empirical evidence suggests consumers 
frequently benefit from vertical arrangements.204  And it likewise suggests 
that consumers broadly benefit from big tech products and services today.  
Many, if not most, of those benefits would be devastated by a new 
inhospitality approach. 
Moreover, empirical evidence and experience indicates government 
intervention along the lines of what the new inhospitality tradition would 
call for is often costly to consumers.  For instance, Lafontaine and Slade 
found “consumers are often worse off when governments require vertical 
separation in markets where firms would have chosen otherwise.”205  They 
further argue, given these findings, that it “behooves government agencies 
to reconsider the validity of such restrictions.”206  Similarly, FTC 
Commissioner Christine Wilson and her Attorney Advisor Keith Klovers 
recently examined the implications of past regulatory actions for the 
digital space.207  Their analysis documents the many pitfalls—and costs to 
consumers—of various policies, including banning vertical integration.208  
From this analysis, they warn that “even the most well-intentioned 
regulations come at a steep cost.”209 
Proponents of a new inhospitality tradition have failed not only to 
provide a sound empirical basis for their policy prescriptions in the first 
instance, but they have likewise failed to consider in any meaningful way 
the potential costs of implementing their proposals.  As noted, regulatory 
efforts and changes tend to come with very real costs.210  These costs 
 
 203. See supra Section III.B. 
 204. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 169. 
 205. Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169, at 663; see also id. at 680 (“[W]e 
have found clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed . . . on owners of 
retail networks are usually detrimental to consumers.”). 
 206. Id. at 680. 
 207. See Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, The Growing Nostalgia for Past Regulatory 
Misadventures and the Risk of Repeating These Mistakes with Big Tech, 8 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 10 (Nov. 7, 2019). 
 208. See id. at 16–18 (“All sides soon realized how economically damaging such a ban would 
be.”). 
 209. Id. at 26. 
 210. See id.; Lafontaine & Slade, Vertical Integration, supra note 169, at 680; see also sources 
cited supra note 169. 
2020] ANTITRUST’S NEW INHOSPITALITY DOCTRINE 1013 
include a real dampening of the dynamic competition that drives firms to 
expand to satisfy consumer demands in new ways, which is critical to our 
modern economy—and which was observed during the first iteration of 
the inhospitality tradition.211  There is no evidence today to suggest that 
the benefits of any such regime would outweigh its costs. 
To the contrary, there is good reason to be concerned that the costs 
would not (and even that they could not) be outweighed.  There is 
particular reason to be concerned about the distributional effects of those 
costs.  As outlined above, the benefits the firms offering lower cost 
products and increased convenience to consumers tends 
disproportionately to benefit lower-income consumers.212  And big tech 
firms often fit both these characteristics—they tend to offer low- (or even 
zero) priced products and services and, simultaneously, often to enhance 
non-price factors like services and ease of use.  Lower-income consumers 
are more sensitive to these kinds of changes—while enhancements 
disproportionately benefit them, any impairments tend to 
disproportionately harm them.213 
Experience from the first iteration of inhospitality demonstrated that 
such a regime’s propensity to impose costs and to cripple competition is 
very real.  Courts during this time routinely, and sometimes explicitly, 
ruled in favor of higher prices (which disparately harmed lower-income 
consumers).  The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, for 
instance, noted “occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of the fragmented industries and markets.”214  Moreover, the 
decisions frequently undermined competition itself, while simultaneously 
failing to foster the other sociopolitical goals they espoused.215  As Herbert 
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Hovenkamp explained, for instance, early efforts to promote small, locally 
owned enterprises by prohibiting exclusive dealing (a form of vertical 
arrangements) “completely destroyed” the very enterprises the decisions 
desired to protect—and “[r]esults of that sort were documented over and 
over.”216  It is critical to bear in mind, when crafting antitrust rules and 
reaching enforcement decisions, the incentives intervention and new legal 
standards would create.  Indeed, as Hovenkamp notes, “[e]ven Justice 
Douglas, otherwise a progressive antitrust activist, foresaw the result” of 
requiring a manufacturer to allow its retailers to sell multiple brands would 
be to create manufacturer “empires” and to decimate small, independent 
businesses.217  Unfortunately, it would seem Justice Douglas had far 
greater foresight than many modern progressive antitrust proponents, who 
would embrace just such unsuccessful remedies today. 
This analysis underscores that a new inhospitality approach would 
likely cost consumers tremendously, and would likely be most harmful to 
those consumers who can least afford it.  History has much to teach us, if 
only we would listen. 
CONCLUSION 
Competition has long been the organizing principle of the American 
economy.  Preserving healthy competition is, accordingly, paramount to 
supporting economic growth and consumer well-being.  Firms in the big 
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tech space have continued to increase their prevalence within the modern 
economy over the last several decades.  And so the current debate 
addressing how antitrust law can best promote competition in the big tech 
space is both timely and important.  While critics warn that the harms they 
identify are unprecedented and require increasingly radical responses, the 
reality is that we have experience with just the type of inhospitality regime 
the more extreme critics argue is necessary.  For decades, courts imposed 
the very kinds of broadscale skepticism and condemnation based solely 
upon the form of the conduct before them that proponents of a new 
inhospitality era support today. 
But the result of the inhospitality regime’s first iteration was not an 
enhancement in the consumer welfare or other sociopolitical goals the 
courts hoped such rules would facilitate.  Instead, it was routinely observed 
that rules based upon the form of conduct, and divorced from the conduct’s 
actual (or likely) effects, undermined the very goals those rules sought to 
achieve.  Economists rigorously investigated these issues and discovered 
that much of the conduct being condemned had affirmatively 
procompetitive effects, which the courts’ decisions were squelching; this 
discovery helped to explain the perverse outcomes they were repeatedly 
observing.  As the new economic learning grew, so, too, did the courts’ 
understanding of the issues before them.  Rather than judging conduct on 
its form, the courts employed economic theory and evidence to make 
decisions based upon conduct’s likely effects.  Rather than judging the 
books by their covers, courts were now reading the books and judging 
them on their merits. 
Enforcement efforts should follow not only theoretical models but also 
empirical evidence.  Until the empirical case is built, calls to return to 
facial condemnation should be ardently resisted.  We should not reject 
economic learning and evidence.  Instead, we should continue to benefit 
from it, by basing our rules and standards upon the best available 
information.  Today, the weight of the evidence demonstrates that 
consumers benefit tremendously from big tech, and that vertical 
arrangements, by and large, are procompetitive or competitively neutral.  
Combined, this evidence indicates that it is unlikely anything is 
fundamentally broken with competition in the big tech space, and that 
firms competing in adjacent and complementary markets is not inherently 
harmful.  Antitrust policy and enforcement, in turn, should reflect that 
reality.  While examples of harmful conduct might exist, they can be 
captured within the existing antitrust regime, and the wide-sweeping 
remedies many have proposed simply do not fit.  The first inhospitality 
regime was incredibly costly to consumers.  A second would likely be just 
as—if not more—harmful. 
